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REDISTRIBUTING WEALTH BY CURTAILING
INHERITANCE: THE COMMUNITY INTEREST IN THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND THE ESTATE TAX
JOHN W. VAN DOREN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The system of private property in the United States has lead to
a vast concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few. One
highly regarded study determined that the top one percent of the
adult population held almost 30 percent of all the personal assets in
this country, including 76 percent of all corporate stock.' Another
study revealed that this top one percent holds 92 percent of all trust
holdings.2 Future interest, trust, and tax avoidance devices have made
such wealth concentration possible by testamentary fiatA
O Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University. A.B., Harvard College, 1956;
LL.B., Yale University, 1959.
1. R. LAMPMAN, THE SHARE OF Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH 1922-56,
at 24, 227 (1962).
2. "The important source of accelerating wealth for the very rich is ownership
income derived from stocks, bonds, and other interests in the productive system. The
concentration of productive wealth is more pronounced than the concentration of
income, and despite the serious lack of information as to the identity of the real owners
of the largest blocks of stocks and bonds in America, one can learn that the trend is
toward more concentration. In 1953, the richest one percent of all adults owned ninety-
two percent of all trust holdings. More recent figures show no change." Figures show
that income distribution is not as unbalanced as wealth distribution due, of course, to
the imposition of the personal income tax. Nevertheless, in 1969 the richest 20%
of American families took home 45 percent of the income. Barnett & Mfiller, A Reporter
At Large, Global Reach-lI, NEw YORKER, Dec. 9, 1974, at 100, 121. See generally Lydall
& Lansing, A Comparison of the Distribution of Personal Income in the United States
and Great Britain, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 43 (1959); H. TUCKMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF THE
RICH (1973).
Current figures on wealth concentration in trusts are hard to obtain, but ample
evidence exists that substantial wealth transmission is not precluded by transfer
tax. Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN. L. REv. 41, 47
n.32 (1957) (30% of trust industry reports about 13,900 trusts averaging some
$15,000 income per year; over 7,000 trusts over $25,000 income, average unknown; also
unknown are private trusts not employing a corporate trustee); Woolfson, Inheritance
Taxation and Maladjustment of National Income, 65 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 371, 372 (1937)
(formerly TRUST COMPANIES) (figures not readily available, but 1912-1923 spot check
by FTC indicated 1% of estimated decedents owned 59% of estimated wealth; average
estate was $3,800, over 91 percent had less; greatest number in $1,000-$2,500 range;
total value greatest in estates of $1 million and over); Comment, Ancient Rules and
Modern Trusts, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 99 n.28 (1950) ($50 billion estimated to be held
by trustees in 1939). Woolfson notes that income tax returns around the time of his
writing confirmed the pattern of concentration.
3. See Note, Power and Probability of Alienation and the Scope of judicial Control
over Actual Alienation, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 968 (1927).
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In the United States holders of this concentrated wealth wield
power greatly disproportionate to their numbers. That power is
often unrelated to the holders' own efforts or achievements. Socialis-
tic or communistic methods of distributing wealth have, in practice,
led to a no more desirable result, as they produce a concentration
of wealth and power in the hands of the government or governmental
officials. Yet it is possible to envision a system that does not promote
concentrations of private or public wealth in the hands of the few.
Such a system would foster the democratic values of equal opportunity
in the marketplace and the arena of government. Modifying the present
wealth transmission process to further this objective can be viewed
as a "private" Sherman Anti-trust Act, related not to corporate
monopolies, but to concentrations of privately held wealth.
The law of property exists in part to resolve the tensions between
vying private claimants and between private claimants and the govern-
ment. However, the law also has a broader impact on society, an im-
pact that requires reevaluation of existing doctrines in light of their
effectiveness in supporting important underlying social values. In-
heritance law is not inherently right because it reflects the particular
balance of a former day. The objective of this article is to suggest
reconsideration of a legal system that allows large concentrations of
wealth to be repeatedly devolved over a century or more, or even over
an indefinite period of time, without being subject to taxation. The
primary focus of this article will be on using the Rule against Perpetui-
ties and estate taxation to effect a redistribution of private wealth in
this country so as to reduce its concentration. The article also analyzes
the form of property holdings; the recent treatment of the Rule by
scholars and by courts; and other considerations in curtailing in-
heritance, including methods of taxation.
II. THE EFFECT OF NEW FORMS OF PROPERTY HOLDINGS
Concentration of wealth in the hands of a small percentage of
the population is alarming in itself. But the impact of wealth con-
centration has been increased by the new forms of property holdings
employed today. Those forms present an opportunity to assert a more
pervasive control over economic and political power in this country
than ever before.
A. Personalty
Forms of wealth and legal doctrine may interact to affect the
pattern of wealth devolution through the generations. 4 Today, shifts
4. For a discussion of how the form of property affects property doctrine see Lynn,
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and changes in property forms have led to vast wealth concentrations
in private hands that are largely subject to inheritance through tra-
ditional legal channels. One prominent shift of wealth following the
industrial revolution was from the form of realty to that of personalty.
Stocks, bonds, and interests in other intangibles replaced land as a
major wealth form.
Due to this shift and the increasing use of the trust form for holding
securities, the Rule against Perpetuities as a rule promoting alien-
ability of property has become relatively unnecessary. The trustee often
has a power of sale over securities even though the beneficial interests
are subject to future interests. Securities are held in a fund which can
be made productive by the corporation, despite future interests in the
shares. But the trust device has also made possible long periods of
continuous management that facilitate concentration of this newer
wealth.
B. The Corporate Share
After the industrial revolution, the corporate share achieved
prominence as a form of ownership. The corporate share made it
possible to hold wealth through a convenient and legally protected
entity, the corporation. Extensive movement to the corporate form
resulted-a movement that has prompted little reconsideration of
devolution doctrine. This new form of property holding is especially
significant because it tends to divorce ownership from managerial
control. Though the corporation is the correlative of the shares, it
is difficult to gain effective managerial control of some widely held
corporations through share ownership. In those instances it appears
that control is continued through self-perpetuating, elite boards and
officers. This power concentration is aggravated by the interlocking
directorates and pyramidal holding companies attendant on the corpor-
ate form. Thus, as Professor Berle has pointed out,5 a relatively small
group of managers, often known only to each other, may control ex-
tensive commercial and industrial enterprises.
C. Quasi-Public Property
The trend toward the abstraction of property was further ac-
centuated in the 1930's by growing interests in pensions and profit
sharing funds, mutual funds, and the like. Wealth held in these forms
has been called quasi-public property because the theme of public
Legal and Economic Implications of the Emergence of Quasi-Public Wealth, 65 YALE
L.J. 786 (1956).
5. See A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 51, 117 (1959).
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interest is present even though there is no state ownership. 6 The
managers of these funds do not own the shares, but can vote them.
This arrangement continued the trend toward separation of owner-
ship and control, referred to by Berle as "power without ownership
of property.' ' 7
Some of this wealth is controlled by private commercial banks,
often through trusts which can vote the stock comprising the corpus.
In the property bundle of sticks, the "voting stick" may thus be
transferred in significant part to the same group of interlocking di-
rectorates that controls much corporate wealth.
D. Government Largesse
Governmentally parceled "rights," called the "new property" or
government largesse, may constitute another stage in the development
of property forms. These rights include government contracts and
subsidies, licenses for air and mass communication, franchises that
may be worth more than the physical inventories, welfare payments,
unemployment insurance, and workman's compensation.' These are
unlike traditional forms of wealth such as land or tangible personalty
in that government has created them by reallocating wealth.
Publicly dispersed wealth appears to be increasing, but it is fal-
lacious to suppose9 that this somehow reduces private property's im-
portance as wealth subject to individual devolution. The shift to
government largesse, giving an increasingly public character to wealth
and its creation, has actually created little change in wealth transmis-
sion. In brief, those controlling private wealth also have control and
favored access to the new forms of public wealth. Those most frequently
receiving government allocations in this new form are the rich and
powerful. 10 Regulatory and licensing agencies of government are often
controlled by the industries they seek to regulate." Powerful capital
concentrations are able to graft the name "right" onto economic ad-
vantage secured from government and vest it in themselves.
6. See R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 182 (1966).
7. A. BERLE, supra note 5, at 51.
8. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
9. But see Phillips, Social Control Through Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 23
CORNELL L.Q., 113, 115 (1937), taking a view that taxation to fund government expendi-
tures diverts capital that would have been used in "building up the business of the
country."
10. See Reich, supra note 8, at 765.
11. Id. at 768. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); E. KEFAUVER, IN A FEw HANDS 191 (1965).
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III. POLICY AND HISTORY OF THE RULE
When the law addresses itself to vying claims of private individuals,
it often pretends that no larger issues are involved. Yet the affirmation
of the right of a private claimant, such as a beneficiary of a will, involves
profound societal ramifications. Affirmation of an individual's property
rights means, for example, that the state cannot redistribute his pro-
perty. It also involves a decision that the beneficiary gets most of the
benefit of societal contributions to property value.
Resolving issues under the Rule against Perpetuities involves con-
flicts between individuals. Lurking on the periphery, however, are
issues of taxation involving the individual and the state. Resolution
of taxation issues determines whether the laissez-faire model will pre-
vail, and distribute property according to what is called a market
mechanism, or whether the alternative concepts of government "in-
tervention" or "interference," themselves shrouded in pejorative, will
prevail. In the latter situation, the notion that property exists to serve
human needs can be recognized through redistribution of wealth by
the government. Thus the Rule against Perpetuities involves much
more than the competing interests of private parties. Since the Rule
permits tying up property free of the estate tax for several generations,
the Rule is an accomplice to preserving concentrations of wealth and
power.
We can see that modern property is based increasingly on control
and control devices. This focus on control is a further step away from
traditional ownership concepts, and a further step toward wealth and
power concentrations. These realities might have led to a stricter
Rule against Perpetuities; interestingly enough, they did not. The
permissiveness of the Rule was extended to personalty, for instance,
apparently without much thought that new measures might be
necessary. There continues to be an unfortunate lack of attention to
this situation and the legal system which perpetuates it. Historically,
future interest doctrine was used to balance power relationships. To-
day reform of the legal superstructure of inheritance is even more
necessary than before to reduce the concentrations of privately held
wealth.1 2
A. Early Future Interest Law
Early future interest law and policy reflected conflicts over wealth
concentration, the division of property control between the living and
the dead, alienability, and the balance of power between competing
12. See Bale, Whither Death Duties: A Lifetime Accessions Tax, A Lifetime Donor's
Tax or the Green Paper? 1974. PuB. L. 121.
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classes of society. It is often overlooked today that one of the original
purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities was to prevent land from
being held in family dynasties forever.
The development of future interest law reflected efforts by the
lords of the manor to keep land wealth concentrated in their hands
rather than permit it to pass to the King or to lesser lords. 13 In this
context, the King's courts were generally hostile to future interests.
Prior to the Statute of Uses (1536) and the Statute of Wills (1540),
feudal incidents akin to the contemporary estate tax fell due upon
descent of property by intestacy. Inter vivos transfers or transfers to
a trustee, recognized by equity, incurred no feudal incidents. 14 These
devices were used to evade feudal incidents, some not unlike the estate
tax. Hence, the doctrines of Shelley's Case 15 and Worthier Title 6
were tax imposition devices of the ruling power structure. The de-
structibility of contingent remainders and the ability of a tenant in
tail to convey a fee simple, either upon birth of issue or, after Talta-
rum's Case, by common recovery, can be viewed in the same perspec-
tive.1 7
Why is the battle for and against feudal incidents now viewed as
"purely historical"? 8 The struggle for control and power that was a
reality in feudal society is still a reality today. The feudal struggle
focused on the trust. While the law side of the English courts did
not recognize the trust, equity came to enforce it at least as early as
the Fourteenth Century. The trust provided a freedom to transfer
property, through what were in effect future interests, in avoidance of
feudal incidents. Trust devices thus enabled members of the landed
classes to keep land in the family. 9 The resulting drop in royal revenues
led to a power struggle between Henry VIII and the greater and lesser
nobility. The Statute of Uses was enacted to restore the King's power
to exact revenue on the devolution of land at death.
The rules governing freedom of testation that grew up in England
were aimed at maintenance of fortunes in the great families of the
landed gentry.20 As land became more available upon the breakup of
13. 5 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 538 (1968) (King wished to limit dynastic impulses
of his competitors).
14. See A. GULLIVER, FUTURE INTERESTS 29 (1959).
15. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 544 (5th ed. 1956).
16. See A. GULLIVER, supra note 14, at 30.
17. See W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 14-15 (1957).
18. See A. GULLIVER, supra note 14, at 21, 26-29.
19. See R. POWELL, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 2, 19 (3d ed. 1961). See also Holds-
worth, The Political Causes Which Shaped The Statute of Uses, 26 HARV. L. REV. 108
(1912), on whom Powell relies.
20. See Nussbaum, Liberty of Testation, 23 A.B.A.J. 183 (1937), citing MAX WEBER,
SOCIAL ECONOMY (1921).
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the manorial feudal system, judges continued to be responsive to ele-
ments seeking land as a major form of wealth. A parallel development
occurred on the continent of Europe. Devices amounting to future
interests existed in German civil law. Wealthy classes used these
devices to preserve their position; in some areas they could only be
used by the aristocracy. In France, the Revolution led to the over-
throw of similar devices used by the aristocracy to preserve vested
privileges.2 1 English curtailment of future interests and other "estate
planning" devices served interconnected purposes: to prevent the
evasion of feudal incidents and to prevent the concentration of power
gained by tying up property in one family.22 The revenue purpose of
anti-future interest doctrines may well have been as significant as
any other.23 Thus the English sought to prevent capital concentrations
by allowing fee ownership in an heir so that the land could be
transferred, or squandered, and thereby reduce the size of the estate
from time to time.
Historically, taxation (or feudal incidents) and anti-future in-
terest doctrine have been used in tandem to adjust wealth and power
concentration. In England, the battles between various levels of gentry
and aspiring gentry were fought with transfers through "purchase"
and transfers by descent. If the interests passing upon death of the
life tenant passed by descent, the overlord gained feudal incidents such
as relief, a counterpart of taxation. Insofar as transfers occurred by
words of "purchase," feudal incidents were usually not payable. If
the words were those of "limitation," feudal incidents were payable.
Thus at common law if a property was transferred to B and his heirs,
the heirs took no interest; the words "and his heirs" were construed
to be "words of limitation." The result was that the overlord gained
feudal incidents when the property descended on B's death. Since
future interest holders took by purchase and not by descent, the holders
of power in the feudal society had a policy against recognizing future
interests. But insofar as property could be parceled out and controlled
through future interests, the wealthy accomplished the functions of
estate planning.
Equity provided counterpoint by moderating the tendency of the
law courts to curtail future interests sharply and thereby preserve in-
cidents. Later doctrines, including the Rule, were used in connection
21. See Rheinstein, Some Fundamental Differences in Real Property Ideas of the
"Civil Law" and the Common Law Systems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 624, 630 (1936)
(analyzing German and French use of civil law equivalents of future interests).
22. See Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARV. L. REV. 721, 726 (1952).
23. See A. GULLIVER, supra note 14, at 26-29.
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with varying feudal incidents to curtail and adjust capital concentra-
tions in some potentially powerful social strata. This purpose has
been ignored or soft pedaled by the current literati of the Rule.
Feudal incidents fell into disuse, but estate taxes payable to the
state appeared as a substitute. As estate duties grew the battle lines
formed more clearly between varying interest groups, e.g., landowning
against mercantile classes, and both of those against the British state.
In adjusting new power realities in a society, some doctrines may re-
main deceptively placid, while the conflicts are fought out in related
areas. Thus the Rule remained somewhat static in England while
commercial and landowning groups fought over what was exempt,
excluded, and deductible from the estate tax.
B. Static Quality of the Rule Today
Perhaps we ask too much of the Rule. It never had as its social
purpose the promotion of a democratic society. However, the Rule
and tax structure, with the help of trusts, not only foster our existing
wealth concentration, but contribute to its undemocratic effects. For
instance, when the Rule is applied, the estate is often treated as an
outright bequest and denied a free tax ride on a generation-skipping
transfer. The result is a glaring example of favoritism to those able to
purchase advice from persons trained in the magic of the Rule, re-
mainders, and powers of appointment. Insofar as the Rule allows trans-
fers by the multigeneration trust to escape estate taxes imposed on out-
right bequests, the generosity of the Rule merges with the generosity of
the tax structure in a happy coincidence for the rich and powerful.
Moreover, recent cases and legislative "reform" movements indicate a
trend toward preventing orthodox applications of the Rule. These
movements often cause a hidden subsidy to pass sub silentio to the
users of multigeneration trusts.
The reason for the relatively static quality of the Rule today can
be traced either to use of tax doctrine to resolve conflicts, or to the
political power of the benefited classes coupled with the inability of
those less favored economically to comprehend and reach this vestige
of privilege. A potential conflict in the Rule's policies exists because
the state's power to tax stands in opposition to the individual's claim
to accumulate. The state could both tax and curtail the propertied
groups' privilege to devolve property through the generations. But
in the United States propertied groups have significant control in
the government, so the Rule and estate tax remain relatively static.
It is significant that during the early development of this country
inheritance was not an issue. Both the landowning aristocracy and
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what became the industrial aristocracy had a tacit common interest in
maintaining their position through a permissive inheritance structure.
Not until those classes were somewhat demoralized by the Depression
were significant inroads made by the taxing structure. Thus, except
for imposition of a relatively minor estate and gift tax and, more in-
directly, by levy of the income tax, no real challenge has been posed
to this inheritance picture.
C. Deficiencies in the Scholarly Treatment of the Rule
There is little discussion of the Rule's policy of preventing wealth
concentration, and indeed little discussion of the reasons for the Rule
at all. Despite the work of the legal realists, the current mode of legal
analysis is still to rationalize decisions and statutes into sets of doctrine.
Excessive emphasis on the current legal positivism tends to obscure
questions of underlying social purpose and the need for justification
of the status quo. It is somewhat disturbing that even those who are
sensitive to the underlying policies of legal rules are not able to bring
about more discussion of those policies. Perhaps most students in a
law school population that consists of lower-middle and middle
classes are not interested in this analysis. The lower-middle class law
student, on the move upward, gains little by questioning the existence
of a given tendency. He sees his job as simply learning the Rule.
Moreover, he sees himself as potentially sharing in the power of the
class benefitted by the Rule. Middle class students are also upward
bound. They view themselves as participating or about to participate
in the privileges the legal structure bestows. Often students are able
to get through an introductory course in future interests and the Rule
against Perpetuities without giving undue thought to meaningful
alternatives that could eliminate the privileges entrenched by the Rule.
Scholarly comment also avoids significant examination of the
reasons for the Rule.2 4 The private wealth pattern that the Rule per-
mits, or meaningful policy alternatives that would change the pattern,
are rarely even considered. I suggest a few reasons why. First, there
is an implicit assumption that inheritance is an appropriate incident
of private property. Second, commentators are often members of the
classes benefitted by the status quo. Third, their expertise and reputa-
tions in the field create a heavily vested interest in the existing "tech-
nology" of the Rule. Finally, some commentators may fear that
24. See, e.g., Jones, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Powers of Appointment: An
Old Controversy Revived, 54 IowA L. REv. 456 (1968) (very little attention given to
reason for Rule); Comment, supra note 4, at 94-95 n.9 (policy foundations of present
Rule period have not been adequately considered).
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radical reforms might not be effective due to the great tendency of
future interest legislation to foster litigation and become unworkable.2 5
However, this seems to be a poor reason for failure to examine alterna-
tives. Although changes do tend to provoke litigation, we have courts
to solve problems arising from legislative policy declarations.
The courts seldom give any reason for applying the Rule. When
the cases do give a reason, it is usually that the Rule will encourage
alienability of property.2 6 The Duke of Norfolk's Case, which began
the development of the Rule, presented this rationale2 7 and many
commentators, including Gray, have supported it.28 But as Professors
Simes and Gulliver have indicated, most property subject to future
interests is in trust and subject to a power of sale. 29 Consequently, the
theory that the Rule prevents property from remaining out of com-
merce, and thus becoming stagnant, appears to be an unacceptable
contemporary rationale. 30
A second reason given for the Rule is curtailment of deadhand
control; the Rule is seen as an intent-defeating policy judgment that
the dead ought not to control property ad infinitum.3 1 The Rule, of
course, is intent defeating. Testators do not generally "intend" to run
afoul of the Rule. But courts often ignore the Rule, and allow an ex-
tension of deadhand control that postpones the incidence of estate
taxation and defeats other policies underlying the Rule.
D. Judicial Disregard for the Rule
A review of cases in the last decade indicates that courts often
avoid the Rule, thus aggravating the problem of wealth accumula-
tion. 2 In some cases the courts are justified on orthodox grounds in
25. See Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The Wait and See Doctrine,
52 MicH. L. REV. 179, 194 (1953).
26. See, e.g,. In re Lewis' Estate, 37 A.2d 482 (Pa. 1944); Rekdahl v. Long,
407 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
27. 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682).
28. See J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 297 (4th ed. 1942); R. LYNN, THE
MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 9, 10 (1966).
29. See A. GULLIVER, supra note 15, at 20, 21; L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 40-41 (1955); Najarian, Charitable Giving and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 70
DICK. L. REV. 455, 457 (1966) (gifts to charity are normally securities which the trustee
can sell).
30. L. SIMES, supra note 29, at 53. See A. GULLIVER, supra note 14, at 21. But see,
Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest, 56 MICH. L. REV. 683,
691 (1958).
31. A. GULLIVER, supra note 14, at 15; L. SIMES, supra note 29, at 58-59.
32. In addition to cases discussed in the text, several other cases indicate that
courts may use construction and other devices either to avoid applying the Rule, or to
avoid applying it to some interests. In Breault v. Feigenholtz, 358 F.2d 39 (7th Cir.
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not applying the Rule. 33 But courts often seemed to strain, apply
minority rules, or invent new doctrines to keep from applying the
Rule. It is not surprising that cases calling for construction occur. In-
deed, there are many future interest cases where no intention can be
inferred, and where no rule of construction presents an inevitable
solution.3 4 In this gray area, courts are showing preference for the
testator's "right to devise," and ignoring Gray's stern warning that the
Rule is inexorable and intent defeating. The courts use of construc-
tion and other devices suggests a trend toward blatant judicial dis-
regard for the Rule.35
Perhaps the high water mark of this trend in recent cases is In Re
Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop.3s There the court applied cy pres to
validate a disposition it admitted violated the Rule. The testamentary
disposition called for vesting trust corpus in sons or daughters of the
testator, or the lawful issue of any deceased son or daughter, upon
the death of the testator's wife or 30 years, whichever occurred last.
1966), the court, on questionable language, found a charity's interest was vested rather
than contingent. Thus, some courts will force the interest into the vested or contingent
category depending on the result deemed desirable. See L. SIMES, FuTuRE INTERESTS 188
(1966). In Second Nat'l Bank v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 283 A.2d 226 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1971), the court played some similar verbal games. The court appeared to
let the result turn on the formalism of the language, allowing the conditions precedent
or subsequent to determine the validity of the gift. See also Estate of Pearson, 275 A.2d
336 (Pa. 1971) ("wait and see" applied); Sellers v. Powers, 426 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. 1968).
Cf., Estate of Kelly v. Patterson, 193 So. 2d 575 (Miss. 1967), where the court applied
the doctrine of equitable approximation to prevent the application of the rule against
direct restraints on alienation.
Some cases, however, do apply the Rule without remorse to void interests. See, e.g.,
Harrison v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 174 S.E.2d 867 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970); Abram v.
Wilson, 220 N.E.2d 739 (Ohio P. Ct. 1966).
33. See, e.g., Carroll v. Robinson, 454 S.W.2d 329 (Ark. 1970); Smyth v. Thomas,
424 P.2d 498 (Kan. 1967); Green v. Green, 221 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio P. Ct. 1966).
In Smyth v. Thomas, the court's finding of no Rule violation appears correct,
assuming, as the court did, that there was a definite failure of issue to be construed.
The testator devised certain real property as follows: to wife Anna, for life, then to my
son, Charles, for life, with remainder to the lawful issue of Charles born in wedlock
who may survive him, provided that in the event Charles shall die without such
issue, then the remainder to the children surviving both my daughters, Constance and
Mae, per capita. All three mentioned children and his wife survived the testator. If
the language, "in the event Charles shall die without such issue," had been interpreted
as an indefinite failure of issue, a Rule violation would have occurred.
34. See Schuyler, The Art of Interpretation in Future Interest Cases, 17 VAND. L.
REV. 1407, 1423 (1964).
35. Perhaps this is not a recent "trend," nor one confined to this side of the
Atlantic. See Sweet, The Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 18
JURIDICIAL REVIEW 132, 157 (1906) (whenever courts can decently do so they construe to
avoid application of the Rule).
36. 469 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970). The court, citing prior cases, admitted construing
around the Rule. The court cited one case where the testator designated 42 measuring
lives in being. Id. at 185-86.
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The court reformed the 30 years to 21 years and upheld the disposition.
The court reasoned that judge-made rules were subject to judge-made
nullification.
In Will of Greenwood5 7 the testator gave the residue of his estate
to his daughter for life, then equally to five named grandchildren and
one named great-granddaughter, "and any other great grandchildren."
The court stated that the great-grandchildren class could include after-
born great-grandchildren whenever born. The court admitted that if
such afterborns were included in the class, there would be a violation
of the Rule. But by utilizing a form of black magic called rules of
construction, the court found no violation of the Rule. The court
reasoned great-grandchildren meant the class of great-grandchildren
living at the testator's death, but could "enlarge" to include afterborn
great-grandchildren until death of the life tenant daughter. Therefore,
great-grandchildren born after the death of the life tenant who might
have had their interest vest beyond any life in being were construed
out of existence. The class-closing rule was used to limit the class in
a manner similar to that employed in In re Wright's Estate, 8 a case
commonly used in future interests courses to illustrate the minority
rule.39
In Industrial National Bank v. Barrett,40 the court, in a case of
first impression in Rhode Island, aligned itself with the minority of
U.S. courts to save a gift. In upholding a testamentary power of ap-
pointment and its exercise, the court determined its validity on the
basis of the date of its exercise and not the date of its creation.41 The
court referred to "logic" and obviation of technical harshness as sup-
37. 268 A.2d 867 (Del. 1970).
38. 131 A. 188 (Pa. 1925).
39. See A. GULLIVER, E. CLARK, L. LUSKY, & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 799-801
(1967); Casner, Class Gifts to Others Than to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin" Increase in the
Class Membership, 51 HARv. L. REv. 254, 306-07 (1937) indicating that class closing is
used as a technique of avoiding the Rule by a small number of courts.
40. 220 A.2d 517 (R.I. 1966).
41. Mr. Tilley predeceased his wife Mary M. Tilley and left her, among other
things, a general testamentary power of appointment over a trust corpus remaining
at her death. Mary's will exercised the power to a trust: income to her granddaughters
Aline and Evelyn for life, then on the death of either granddaughter to pay income
to her issue per stirpes, with power to pay principal to her said grandchildren or the
issue of any deceased grandchild for certain purposes. Additional great-grandchildren
were born after the death of Mr. Tilley and before the death of Mary Tilley. One
great-grandchild was born after Mary's death.
One initial hurdle was the perpetuities savings clause which was arguably ineffective
as a savings clause. The savings clause called for an end to the trust no later than 21
years after the death of the last survivor of the younger grandchild or the issue of either
grandchild of the testatrix living at the testatrix' death.
The phrase, last survivor, could mean many things. It could mean that two great-
grandchildren born after the death of Mr. Tilley could be living at Mary Tilley's death,
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port for its decision. Some logic favors the court, other logic does not.
What of the "logic" that the donee of a testamentary power cannot sell
or dispose of the property during his lifetime? Coupling this rule with
a new period from the death of the donee extends the permissible
tying up of the property. One man's technical harshness is another
man's circumvention of a rule against deadhand control.
Another example of judicial manipulation to save a gift from the
Rule is the case of West v. Storm.42 The testator directed his trustees
to deliver certain letters to various persons after his death as though
"written today," and left certain instructions as to where he was
to be buried and directions for an inscription on his mausoleum. He
further specified payment of debts and taxes, and inartfully said that
there would be no distribution under his will until the above direc-
tions had been followed. Ordinarily, the Rule is violated when dis-
tribution is delayed until payment of debts or probate of the will,43
and it was argued that the letters might not be delivered within the
period of the Rule.
There thus appeared to be a clear condition precedent, voiding
the gifts. However, the court, using the magic of "interpretation,"
found that the testator meant for the letters to be delivered, and
for the inscription to be made on the mausoleum, within the normal
period of administration, similarly to the payment of debts. The court
then found that by "distribution," the testator meant the payment
of money to heirs or legatees, and not transfer of title to the trustees.
Therefore, the court held the "distributions" to various persons
constituted "postponement of enjoyment rather than a condition pre-
cedent to vesting."4 4
The West court stated that its permissive interpretation of the
Rule avoided intestacy, a delay in vesting, and forfeitures of interest,
and that it protected residuary gifts to charity. These policies, the court
noted, are "favored by the law. ' '4 5 It seems apparent from our analysis
of wealth concentration that we ought to reexamine whether an un-
qualified right to devise should be a policy "favored by the law."
and one would not know which outlived the other until beyond 21 years after her
death. Reading this back into Mr. Tilley's will, this would be an arguable violation.
But the court took the view that the validity was judged from her exercise, and it
therefore was valid. The court found "survivor" of the younger grandchild to mean
one of her grandchildren's issue.
42. 217 N.E.2d 825 (Ill. Ct. App. 1966).
43. See Schuyler, The Statute Concerning Perpetuities, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 3, 16 (1970).
44. 217 N.E.2d at 828.
45. Id.
1975)
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IV. REFORMING THE RULE
A. The Direction of Previous Reform
Proposals for reform of the Rule have been offered only on a very
limited basis and have not questioned the underlying policy prefer-
ences of the Rule in favor of the rich and powerful. Actually, the "re-
form" is usually directed at allowing the rich to better carry out their
intent to avoid tax and to control property in the distant future. The
application of cy pres, advocated by some commentators and adopted
by some courts,46 would have this effect. Similarly, the "wait and see"
principle will prevent the application of the Rule and immediate
estate taxation.4 7 It is important to realize that state legislatures and
the courts can, by preventing the application of the orthodox Rule,
defeat the policy of the federal estate tax.
Most attacks on the Rule assume that what the Rule attempts to
do is basically sound, but address Rule results that are deemed unjust.
Thus, Professor Leach's criticism goes to fertile octogenarians, pre-
cocious toddlers, administrative contingencies and the like. These are
essentially situations where property goes to heirs or residuary lega-
tees because the Rule operates to void a "remote" gift. Professor Simes
would apparently agree that alienability arguments no longer support
the Rule, but he rises in defenseoof the Rule as a happy compromise
between control of property by the living and control by the dead.
Another reform called a "rule of discrete invalidity" would avoid the
"harshness" of an aspect of the common law Rule, going even further
than "wait and see." 48 A few reformers have attacked the Rule on the
basis of perpetuating deadhand control as such, presumably as opposed
to control by the living.4 9
When one observes the equanimity with which great capital wealth
is perpetuated, viewing the problem only in terms of living versus
deadhand control is a rather limited perspective. Broader questions
need be asked. What claims do the dying, or the living for that
matter, have to the control of excessive wealth? Does property have
a social function? Is the concentration of wealth permitted by the
46. See Browder, Construction, Reformation and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
62 MicH. L. RV. 1 (1963) (New Hampshire and Mississippi have adopted cy pres by
court decision).
47. But see Waterbury, supra note 2, at 82-84 (close analysis of tax results of
"wait and see" indicates minimal revenue loss).
48. See Fletcher, A Rule of Discrete Invalidity: Perpetuities Reform Without Wait-
ing, 20 STAN. L. REV. 459, 463 n.12 (1968).
49. See A. GULLIVER, E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, GRATUrITous TRANSFERs 3
(1967).
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existing superstructure of property law appropriate to a democratic
society?
B. Using the Rule To Limit Wealth Concentration
Authorities on the Rule have developed different viewpoints on
whether the Rule today should serve the purpose of preventing family
capital concentration. Professor Leach has stated that the Rule need
not further serve that function because the graduated income tax and
estate tax are available to eliminate any threat to the public welfare
from family dynasties built on great landed or capital wealth.50
Professor Simes adds that any changes to further break up undue
capital concentrations should come through tax legislation and not
through changes in the Rule.- Professor Waterbury's penetrating
analysis of perpetuities reform also concludes that the issue of wealth
concentration ought to be handled separately.5 2 Professor Gulliver sees
well-to-do families as vanishing in America, but notes the Rule could
serve as a mild private antitrust law. He suggests that outright owner-
ship might lead to capital dissipation. 53 Professor Lynn observes that
insofar as the Rule attempted to prevent family dynasties, it has been
a signal failure.5 4 No one seems to argue that the Rule itself, without an
accompanying tax structure, has prevented or could prevent capital
concentration. Indeed, one historical function of the Rule was to in-
crease the subjection of estates to taxation.
The suggestion that a traditional function of the Rule can be over-
looked because taxes have prevented concentrations of wealth in
family dynasties deserves, to say the least, further scrutiny. Leach's
view that most aspects of powers of appointment should not be taxed
has been criticized by Dean Griswold as showing a bias toward tax
avoidance. He suggests property lawyers say "[we're] pretty well en-
trenched, and we think we'll stay here until we're driven out."55 Reply-
ing to the assertion that the tax has eliminated the empire builders, an-
other commentator has asked, from whence do empire builders come?56
In fact, the particular compromise of the Rule and its death tax con-
sequences first favored the landed gentry, and later the industrial
managerial aristocracy. The development of the Rule after the in-
50. Leach, supra note 22, at 727.
51. L. SIMES, supra note 29, at 57.
52. Waterbury, supra note 2, at 50-51.
53. A. GULLIVER, supra note 14, at 16.
54. R. LYNN, supra note 6, at 9-10.
55. Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax, In Reply, 52
HARV. L. REV. 929, 967 (1939).
56. Waterbury, supra note 2, at 45.
48 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.3:33
dustrial revolution reflected attempts of the landed gentry to escape
the impact of the industrial revolution and the consequential rise of
the commercial classes. 57 The prevailing interpretation of the Rule
was extended to personalty, thus allowing future interests in new
wealth forms for at least one generation. This development was instru-
mental in maintaining the American industrial aristocracy. 58 The
tendency of accumulated wealth to continue its hegemony by escaping
taxation is the current stage in the development of attempts to exploit
the permissiveness of the Rule. 59
Practically anything a testator desires to do can be done within the
Rule.60 Sophisticated testators can avoid estate taxes, not only for
possibly 80-100 years before the Rule applies, but also until the death
of the remainderman, perhaps some 50 years later.61 Courts applying
the Rule thus fail to protect the public welfare from the predatory
rich while imposing forfeitures on others because of bad draftsman-
ship.6' Subjecting a disposition to the Rule may mean a gift will fail.
It then often goes to heirs or residuary legatees instead of remote
beneficiaries. In any event, application of the Rule eliminates some
future interests, so the gift may be subject to tax upon the next transfer.
It may be asked, whom does the Rule catch? Perhaps it does not catch
those lawyers sufficiently specialized to be cognizant of the Rule. If
so, the Rule further encourages wealth concentration, since the rich
can buy the expertise to avoid the Rule's impact.63
Adjusting the Rule to curtail or eliminate the use of future in-
terests may possibly be the best vehicle by which to avoid wealth con-
centration. Historically the purposes of the Rule and the estate tax
have been coordinated and interconnected. Efforts to restrict the use
of future interests were directed both toward breaking up capital
concentration and toward a more frequent imposition of tax. Closing
the Rule period today, and thus curtailing the use of future interests,
would have the same objectives as these efforts did in the Middle Ages.
Elimination of the tax incentive for using multigeneration trusts
would achieve the same results. Moreover, the use of tax policy to
57. See 4A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2013 (1961, Supp. 1972).
58. Id.
59. Cf. Note, Power and Probability of Alienation and the Scope of judicial Con-
trol over Actual Alienation, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 968 (1927).
60. See W. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, supra note 17, at 24.
61. See In re Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970), where the court
indicated the testator's trust could legally run a century or more; Young, Proposed
Revisions of the Federal Estate and Gift Tax Laws, The ALI Revisited, 5 GA. L. REv.
75, 86 (1970).
62. See Leach, supra note 22, at 723.
63. Cf. Bale, supra note 12, at 138.
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clamp down on the generation-skipping trust would lessen the use of
future interests and would minimize other undesirable policy con-
sequences of the existing, permissive Rule.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Taxing Successive Transfers
Generation-skipping trusts offer a significant subsidy to the rich.
A testamentary transfer in trust from A to trustee, income to children
for life, then to the grandchildren, spans generations without imposi-
tion of a federal estate tax. The absence of data in the past has left us
in the dark as to how often and by whom future interests are used to
avoid taxation. However, one recent study has analyzed estate tax
returns from 1957-59. The findings are immensely significant. The
study defines a generation-skipping trust as one in which, e.g., the
property passes from children to grandchildren without imposition of
estate tax. It does not include a transfer to wife, then corpus to child-
ren, though the transfer to children occurs without an imposition of
estate tax.64 If the study had focused on the property passed through
this device to the first generation (children of the testator) the results
might have been even more dramatic.
The study helps explode the myth that taxation of successive trans-
fers would fall primarily on poor widows and orphans. Taxation of
successive transfers would primarily reach the millionaire, rather than
the person of moderate means. The study disclosed that in gross
estates under $300,000, very little use of trusts is made, and that most
of the property bequeathed in trust will be taxed again in the estates
of the settlor's children.6 5 In gross estates of $300,000 to $1 million,
and especially in gross estates greater than $1 million, trust use is
much greater.66 About $1 billion was placed in generation-skipping
family trusts in these two years. The legatees, spouses, children and
grandchildren received more than $10 billion in outright bequests
during this period. Considering just the millionaire group, millionaire
widows bequeathed nearly two-thirds as much property in generation-
skipping family trusts as they did outright to their families. Millionaire
divorcees bequeathed more property in generation-skipping family
trusts than they did in outright legaciesY.7 Thus, decedents with gross
estates over $1 million frequently bequeathed property in generation-
skipping family trusts to distant descendants with income to inter-
64. G. JANTSCHER, TRUSTS AND ESTATE TAXATION 57-59 (1967).
65. Id. at 157.
66. Id. at. 118-20.
67. Id. at 128-29.
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vening generations. s However, even among decedents most likely to
use generation-skipping trusts, the majority did not use this device. 9
The English appear to have adopted the approach of eliminating
generation skipping as a tax avoidance tool. 70 The problem of equaliz-
ing taxation of outright bequests and bequests by future interest is
somewhat separable from ideology; its basis is a kind of equal protec-
tion. But taxation of outright bequests and future interest trusts on a
similar basis has proved extremely difficult. 71 The American Law In-
stitute has made tax equalization proposals to the House Ways and
Means Committee. 72 Legislation on the matter has not been forth-
coming. The Treasury has made stricter and better proposals, which
would go further in treating outright transfers and generation-skipping
transfers similarly.7 3
I recommend a joint approach: elimination of the tax advantages
of successive transfers, and formulation of a Federal Rule against
Perpetuities that will make for uniformity in tax policy. Both measures
are necessary because curtailment of future interests alone would only
ensure that someone will have the property in possession at some
closer point in the future; if the recipient squanders the property, it
will go untaxed. Of course, if the tax policy were tightened to the
maximum remote use of future interests might become a dead letter,
since the millionaire group uses it, at least in significant part, to avoid
taxation.
B. A Federal Rule Against Perpetuities
Professor Waterbury's argument in favor of the existing Rule is
typical and deserves attention.7 4 He says a testator should be able to
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 162-66.
71. See Bale, supra note 12, at 135, suggesting that no tax system has adequately
been able to deal with the problem of generation skipping. Discretionary twists are a
leading escape hatch here. Waterbury, supra note 2, at 50-51, n.44. Waterbury concludes
achieving equality between outright bequests and successive estates is difficult. For
example, if the remainderman predeceases the life tenant, English law, which apparently
taxes the whole estate in the remainderman's estate and also on the subsequent death
of the life tenant, imposes a greater tax than if the property were passed outright. It
would have been taxed only once in the latter situation-upon the death of the out-
right bequest recipient (the life tenant). Waterbury, nonetheless, favors eliminating
the present advantage of successive remainder estates over outright bequests as the
lesser of the evils.
72. See Young, supra note 61, at 75. For A.L.I. original proposals, see A.L.I. FED.
ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION §§ X41-43, App. B at 351-410 (1969). The proposed legislation
approximates equality of taxation on transfers. For an alternative plan, see G. JANTScHER,
supra note 64, at 172-90.
73. See Young, supra note 61, at 88.
74. See Waterbury, supra note 2.
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provide in trust for his wife and minor or inexperienced children,
with something left over for future generations. Assuming arguendo
that such trusts should be permissible, does that argument extend to
adult children, grandsons, nephews, grandnephews, strangers, etc.?
Where does one draw the line as to how many future generations and
how much wealth devolution one permits?
Waterbury's conclusion that no vital public interest appears at
stake and that testamentary transfers are purely a matter between the
testator and his heirs requires examination. The community has a
vital interest in the fact that concentrations of wealth by inheritance
give some persons advantages over others, a fact not easily reconcilable
with a democratic philosophy. It is not unreasonable, however, that
spouses and minor children be permitted a reasonable inheritance.
Another objection to closing the Rule period is that it is "practical-
ly impossible" to change the perpetuities law of the state jurisdictions.
Professor Waterbury points to the probability that actions curtailing
inheritance in some states would merely result in a flow of wealth
to states that retained the current policy toward inheritance. A
Federal Rule against Perpetuities could be devised that would obviate
this "practical impossibility" and lack of uniformity. The Federal
Rule could be constitutionally tied to taxing powers of the federal
government. Alternatively, the federal estate tax credit for state death
taxes could be conditioned upon state enactment of a model Rule.
The Federal Rule might continue the common law rule except
as hereinafter modified:
No interest is good unless it (1) must vest in possession, rather than
interest, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the
creation of the interest, and (2) must vest in possession, if at all,
within 50 years from the creation of the interest.
A model for the second clause is provided by an Illinois statute re-
stricting the possibility of reverter and right of entry to 40 years from
the date of creation.5 The Illinois experience suggests the feasibility
of extending that approach to other types of future interests. However,
the 50-year term of the Federal Rule should be progressively shortened
as the effect of the new Rule is analyzed.
The Federal Rule suggested here is related to prior proposals.
Professor Waterbury has proposed a restriction of the common law
rule to require vesting in possession, free of trust and in absolute
ownership, at the expiration of the perpetuities period. He would also
extend the period in gross to 30 years. Professor Simes also discusses
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 37b-h (1973). Since rights of entry and possibilities of
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the possibility of having a future interest vest in possession in the
period of the Rule. These in themselves represent minimal, but never-
theless desirable, reforms. They should be considered if the proposed
Federal Rule is not politically feasible at this time.
In considering future interest reforms, we should consider the
pattern future interests have taken in developed civil law countries.
Future estates in land and personalty were curtailed in France after
the Revolution. Such curtailment may redistribute wealth and ac-
complish other desirable policy results. For example, curtailment of
future interests increases marketability of land, since future interests
impede the power of any one person to convey the fee.
In the United States, the presence of future interest fetters on land
still presents a policy problem; interests such as vested remainders,
reverters, and rights of entry involve possibly irrational land use
policy. Our courts can presently order the sale of land and substitution
of a fund for the future interest holder. This allows the fee holder
to convey a fee despite a future interest, but this is apparently done
only under limited circumstances, as when the sale is necessary to make
mortgage payments to prevent forfeiture of the improvements. Some
have said there is no excuse for having rights of entry and possibilities
of reverter exempt from the Rule.7 6 My recommendation is that these
future interests be exempt from any Federal Rule. A time limitation,
such as that in Illinois, should be placed on these interests by separate
legislation.
C. Standing To Challenge Rule Violations
Rule violations can be challenged in court only if the persons or
institutions involved in the controversy activate the issue. Probably
many cases of Rule avoidance are settled before reaching the courts.
Presumably, ignorance of violations prevents many challenges. Ad-
ditionally, parties may be reluctant to press Rule violations because
they might create disharmony in a family unit.
The state has a genuine interest in preventing Rule avoidance. It
suffers a financial loss when the avoidance of the orthodox Rule re-
sults in a loss of estate tax revenue. Because of the state's strong interest
in wealth devolution, state agencies, such as the Treasury, should have
standing to litigate Rule violations.
reverter have not been subject to the Rule in this country, the Illinois approach
limiting those interests would seem preferable. There is the further advantage of
experience under that approach and the knowledge that the world has continued
to revolve on its axis.
76. See, e.g., E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF REAL PROPERTY LAW 217 (1974); Goldstein,
Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54
HARV. L. Rv. 248 (1940) (calling for states to abolish the remedy by.forfeiture).
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D. Estate and Gilt Tax Reform
It is beyond the scope of this article to deal fully with estate
planning methods for avoiding estate and gift tax. But the problems
created by those methods are clear. Lifetime gifts of insurance, for
example, can be made without gift or estate taxes on the transfer
to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured.7 7 The gift tax is
based on the replacement value of the policy at the time of the gift,
rather than the policy's face value. If the cash value is small at the
time of the transfer, for a small gift tax the donor may be able to pass
unlimited amounts of life insurance at his death without incurring
estate taxes.78 Furthermore, future interests and trusts can be used
to transfer proceeds to the issue of a son or daughter, allowing the
sum to escape the tax a second time as it passes from one generation
to another.
Insurance on the life of another, particularly when coupled with
a generation-skipping or "grandfather" trust, presents attractive tax
avoidance techniques. Flexibility can be obtained with genera-
tion skipping through the device of a tax-free special power of appoint-
ment. Essentially, the technique calls for insurance, perhaps on the
son's life, payable at his death to such of his children as he appoints.
While the estate tax avoided through multigeneration trusts is
significant, it is not the only problem that exists. A full scale overhaul
of the rates and avoidance techniques related to the estate and gift tax
is needed. For example, Professor Bittker has recommended that the
$60,000 estate tax exemption be lowered to $25,000, coupled with a
"dependency exemption." He would increase rates applicable after
the exemption to 25 percent, rising to 50 or 60 percent at the $1 million
level, and continuing upward to a final marginal rate of 80 percent
at the $15 million level. 79 These approaches represent a good starting
point, although experience might lead to further rate adjustment.
Still another problem is the stepped-up basis given an heir on
appreciated property. This is a great advantage to holders of stock
77. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFt TAX 792-95 (2d Ed. 1962)
To achieve this one must not leave a possible reversion, and some gift taxes may be in-
curred along the way.
78. Id. at 795-801. The donor can avoid payment of gift taxes by purchasing a
form of insurance that has a sufficiently low premium to be less than the annual ex-
clusion of § 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
79. See Bittker, Federal Estate Tax Reform: Exemptions and Rates, 57 A.B.A.J. 236,
239-240 (1971). The "dependency exemption" would result ordinarily in no greater tax
liability for two-thirds of the returns filed, (e.g., $150,000 or less) if the decedent is
survived by young children or other persons qualifying for the dependency exemption.
The tax burden would rise, however, for decedents not survived by a spouse or minor
children, as well as for larger estates. Id. at 240.
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that has risen in value. Congress has received bills attempting
to deal with this loophole, which has been estimated to pass $15 billion
yearly in capital gains outside the income tax system. 0 None has yet
passed.
Other means of avoidance particularly attractive to some are an-
nuities,"' gifts to minors, 2 and use of the marital deductions 3 Bargain
rates for gifts should be abolished by applying the same tax rates to
estates and gifts.8 4 All other gratuitous transfers, by whatever device,
should be taxed in some manner.85
VI. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN CURTAILING INHERITANCE
So far I have suggested that wealth concentrations should be
broken up, and have offered some specific proposals that would ac-
complish this by changes in the law of inheritance and the estate and
gift tax scheme. It is now appropriate to discuss the possible long-
range ramifications of such action. Attention will be focused on those
arguments most frequently offered in opposition to a tightening of the
inheritance laws.
A. The Effect on Trust Funds
Applying a stricter Rule against Perpetuities to property held in
private trusts raises issues involving investment capital, risk capital,
and the trustees' investment policies. Also involved is the question of
who shall control property-the dead or the living. While most of
the property subject to future interests today is personalty subject to
the trustee's power to sell, the standards governing investment of
trust property are conservative and may favor established interests.
Professor Simes points out that funds held in trust tend to be
eliminated from use as risk or venture capital."" Moreover, if funds
were distributed directly, the recipients could buy consumer goods.
Trustees, however, can only engage in capital investments, such as
purchases of bonds, mortgages, and stocks. Professor Simes states that
80. See, e.g., Young, supra note 61, at 91, 93.
81. See C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 77, at 802-07.
82. See id. at 812-816.
83. See id. at 816.
84. See Bittker, Book Review, 56 YALE L.J. 1286, 1290 (1947), discussing unwarranted
disparity in tax between intervivos and testamentary transfers.
85. McDougal, Future Interest Restated: Tradition vs. Clarification and Reform, 55
HARv. L. REv. 1114 n.57 (1952).
86. L. SIMEs, supra note 29, at 60-61. The restriction on venture capital is another
reason why the Rule is too permissive. See Downing, The Duration and Indestructibility
of Private Trusts, 16 CAsE W. REs. L. REv., 350, 365-68 (1965).
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in time of economic depression and individual misfortune it may be
socially undesirable to freeze too much of the world's wealth in the
form of capital. The Rule against Perpetuities, he concludes, tends
to prevent a long-continued freezing of capital. Tax policies discourag-
ing the use of future interests would accomplish the same end.
In defense of the current Rule period Professor Simes has argued
that accumulations of capital and income resulting from a lengthy
trust are desirable in that savings are necessary for the economy. He
analogizes this argument to the economic theory of foregoing current
consumption in order that savings can be accumulated and converted
to "capital." But the withdrawal of huge sums into trust "savings"
could result in having too little available for consumption purchases
in the short run.1
7
Professor Simes concludes: "Whether one should favor a free
economy in which to determine how much savings should be made;
or whether the legislation of a managed economy should broaden the
base of expenditures for consumers' goods, is not our problem." ss But
savings, investments, and funds available for consumer expenditures
are constantly affected by governmental actions-witness tax cuts, wage
and price guidelines, and international currency exchange rates. Simes
does not explain why he thinks broader economic concerns are ir-
relevant. He defines the problem simply as one of deadhand control
versus control by the living, and by so defining the issue, eliminates the
social and economic responsibility of this Rule. Why should social and
economic consequences of the Rule stop at deadhand control? Ful-
filling the social goals of lessening wealth concentration and keeping
property unfettered is more important than the mere determination
of rights between individuals.8 9
B. Individual Rights and Incentive
Some have argued that inheritance is a "natural right" not subject
to the power of the state, but this is not supported by history. At early
common law there was no inheritance.90 On a broader scale a "natural
right of inheritance" can be countered by a natural, democratic
right of the public to equality of opportunity and enhancement of
human dignity otherwise curtailed by excessive inheritance and capital
concentration. If unqualified rights of property ever existed, they are
87. See Woolfson, supra note 2, at 375 (too much saving can produce deficiency of
funds for consumption, hurting economy).
88. L. SIMES, supra note 29, at 99.
89. See Downing, supra note 86, at 362.
90. See W. SCHULTZ, THE TAXATION OF INHERITANCE 173 (1926).
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now commonly curtailed in the public interest. Moreover, Jefferson's
lofty concept is apposite: "The earth belongs in usufruct to the living;
the dead have neither powers nor rights over it."'91
One argument used to support the "natural right" to inheritance
is that it is "indispensable to the development of families. ' ' 92 Briefly,
it may be answered that wealth also destroys families, as when they
fight over who gets what. It is also maintained that inherited wealth
allows some to pursue useful lives in science, the arts and public life
without having to seek gain therein.93 While this may be true in some
instances, it is equally true that those with large accumulations may
use public life to further or maintain their own class positions rather
than to make contributions to society.
Another, more pragmatic, argument is that reducing private con-
trol over inheritance would discourage incentive. 94 One question is,
whose incentive? Would the incentive of those "disenfranchised" by
the present system be as discouraged if they had an equal opportunity?
Do we know why managers and business persons devote such time and
energy to property acquisition? Is their motivation significantly related
to the control of wealth for successive generations?95 Some classical
economists maintained that man amasses wealth to create family for-
tunes, and that he will lose interest and ambition if thwarted.96 It can
logically be argued that nearly the reverse is true-that the challenge
and difficulty of succeeding in a given enterprise is the primary motiva-
tion for undertaking and continuing the struggle.9 7 The real motivator
may be accomplishment or achievement for its own sake and for short-
term rewards.
In the 1930's the incentive issue was raised during hearings on
91. Quoted in id.
92. Id. at 197.
93. Id.
94. Tax policies may lead to a destruction of wealth so that none is available for
redistribution. See Phillips, Social Control Through Taxation of Estates and Trusts,
23 CORNELL L.Q. 113, 114-15 (1937).
95. See A. CHANDLER, JR. & S. SALSBURY, PIERRE S. DUPONT AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN CORPORATION 563 (1971). DuPont, who in 1924 had substantial interest in
DuPont and General Motors, made transfers during life to avoid an increase in tax
from 25 percent to 40 percent on estates over $10 million. " 'I [DuPont] often wonder
why so many people hang on to their fortune and property instead of having the fun
of watching the distribution processes themselves.' Since the tax laws [give] no incentive
to accumulate, 'why not enjoy the dissociation processes. I have had much more satis-
faction in planning for roads, schools and hospitals, etc. than in continuing the piling
up process .... '" Id. He did not like the inheritance tax law, and he probably would
not have enjoyed the "dissociation" process if faced with a heavy gift tax.
96. W. SCHULTZ, supra note 90, at 169.
97. Cf. Boehm, Cause and Effect: Federal Estate Tax Revision Tied by Law to Social
Consequences, 41 TEX L. REv. 479, 486 n.28 (1965).
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inheritance tax legislation. Senator Tom Connally criticized accretions
to private capital unassociated with management-the absentee in-
dustrialist, as it were. He favored taxation to prevent the Ford family
from entailing property through the generations, apparently viewing
taxation as a method of redistributing wealth. "" In rebuttal, Treasury
Secretary Mills suggested increased taxation would inhibit potential
Henry Fords. 99 But one commentator who studied the rise of the first in-
dustrial entrepeneurs in England singled out an "urge to activity,"
apparently unassociated with acquisitiveness, as an important
characteristic of the early entrepeneur.100 Andrew Carnegie felt that
captains of industry did not accumulate so much for their posterity
as for the joy of the struggle of accumulation."' Furthermore, many
persons in higher income brackets are not immune from the Protestant
Ethic which requires work for secular or religious salvation. Studies
have also shown that neither individual effort nor economic growth
has been inhibited by the presence of a tax. °2 It can also be argued
that the curtailing-of-incentive position would be more applicable
to income tax increases than to reductions in inherited wealth.
Moreover, is incentive, if that is the issue, the only important social
98. R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 158-59 (1954). Historically, two con-
tentions have been offered concerning wealth: failing to control the concentration of
wealth would be the downfall of capitalism; and control of wealth would be its down-
fall. See id. at 152, 158, 178. In 1932, Congressman LaGuardia testified that a purpose of
income and estate tax was to prevent undue concentration of wealth. He listed a
number of persons with estates running over $200 million. Secretary of the Treasury
Ogden Mills thought estate taxation would cripple the system, by "destroying working
capital." He preferred semi-public corporations with a fixed return. Id. at 159. Represent-
ative Pettengill of Indiana urged higher estate taxes for the "survival of capitalism,"
noting that increased rates in Great Britain had not unduly discouraged thrift or accumu-
lation and concentration of wealth had dried up purchasing power. In 1953, he reversed
himself, taking the view that progressive taxation would make the state the sole
source of capital, credit and payrolls, master of the fate of all.
99. Id. at 159.
100. J.W. GoUtH, THE RISE OF THE ENTREPENEUR 290 (1969).
101. See W. SCHULTZ, supra note 90, at 196-97; A. HUTCmNSON, THE LIMITS OF
WEALTH 272-74 (1907).
102. See Cooper, Taxation and Incentive in Mobilization, in READINGS IN THE
ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 470, 472, 477, 490-91 (R. Musgrove & C. Shoup ed. 1959).
The author suggests that a conclusion that increased income tax reduces incentive is a
myth-subject to some qualifications. See Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United
States Estate and Gift Tax, Appendix F in SHOUP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs,
228, 234-35 (1966), who asserts there is no indication that estate accumulators have
become discouraged by high rates of death tax. The evidence is somewhat indirect, as
perhaps it must be. The author argues: (1) efforts to avoid tax by generation-skipping
trusts and gifts have not increased; (2) the number of estates around the exemption
level would have incieased as holders of larger estates failed to accumulate because of
the tax. For those interested in further study of economic approaches to incentive and
taxation, see Bibliography, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, supra, at 555-56.
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goal? Why should the legal system provide an "operational headstart"
to individuals who already occupy a superior position in society?" 3
Why protect a second or third generation coupon clipper whose wealth
is unrelated to his own efforts?1 4 Prevailing inheritance structures con-
flict with the fundamental democratic notion of equal opportunity.
0 5
Wealth is the product of the community as well as the individual, and
the community properly claims its share through taxation. The state
may be viewed as the silent partner of wealth acquisition, so that when
the citizen partner dies, the silent partner should share in the capital.0
While such a proration may be difficult,"° , so are other divisions which
the law makes. To a significant degree the present distribution merely
proceeds from an antecedent distribution of wealth whose sacredness
and legitimacy are at least subject to question.
C. Effect on the Performance of Corporations
One possibly disturbing feature of tightening inheritance is the
potential effect on performance of corporations. One study indicates
that corporations run by owners (owning around 20 percent of the
stock) are better performers than management operated firms.0 8 The
suggestion is that managers seek maximization of their own earnings,
which may not be coincident with corporate profit maximization. 0 9
Similarly, Professor Galbraith has suggested that corporation managers
may seek to extend their own spheres of control rather than maximize
profit. Some question may remain as to whether breaking up the own-
ership pattern would affect firm performance.
A significant number of the largest 200 non-financial corporations,
103. See J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 39 (1959); G. JANTSCHER, supra note
64, at 158 (accidents of birth should not favor the few in a competition for wealth
and position that ought to be based on talent and initiative); W. SCHULTZ, supra note 90,
at 167-68. Professor Galbraith also notes that discussions of fortuitous devolution of
wealth are often muted by those who might be subjected to an equalization process.
J. GALBRAITH, supra.
104. See F.D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 79 CONG.
REC. 9658 (1935) (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt). Both Presidents Roosevelt
felt that a progressive tax on large fortunes preserves equality of opportunity for younger
generations.
105. See Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 253 (1943) (future interests as present-
ly constituted lead to over-concentration of wealth inconsistent with basic democratic
values).
106. See W. SHULTZ, supra note 90, at 181-82.
107. Id.
108. See Monsen, Chiu & Cooley, The Effect of Separation of Ownership and
Control on the Performance of the Large Firm, 82 QUARTERLY J. OF EC. 435, 442 (1968).
109. Id.
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however, are controlled by management, not owners. 110 In 1963, five
of the largest 200 firms were controlled by families through key offices
in the corporation rather than through stock ownership. 1" One study
suggested that many large firms have reached a size so great that their
control is beyond the financial means of an individual. 1 2 With respect
to these firms, tightening inheritance would have little effect on per-
formance; the traditional owner has already been displaced.
D. Taxing More of the Inherited Wealth
A primary objective of the proposals offered in this article is to
make more of the concentrated wealth subject to inheritance taxation.
Although the purpose is not primarily to create revenue, but to reduce
concentrations of wealth, the mechanism is the same. Some of the
opposition to a tightening of the inheritance law concerns discontent
with this type of taxation.
Numerous arguments have been posed in opposition to an in-
heritance tax. Adam Smith pointed out a potential inequity in that
fortuitous deaths may subject some families' property to more frequent
taxation than other families' property. He also argued that the in-
heritance tax "diminish[ed] the funds destined for the maintenance of
productive labor. ' ' 1 3 The latter argument, if valid, could be leveled at
other governmental taxes also. The state has assumed the power to
tax, and been upheld in doing so, on the theory that the state creates
inheritance rights and what the state creates it can take. 14 It has also
been argued that inheritance violates a "property right" of the living,
since a devise is a postponed gift, and limiting inter vivos gifts would
presumably also contravene a property right.1 5 An answer is that
gifts have in fact been limited by the gift tax, and otherwise.
An inheritance tax can be viewed as a quid pro quo for protection
of property. An expansion of the tax could thus be justified on the
basis that greater protection is required for larger amounts of prop-
erty. Heightened protection of large property holdings is exemplified
by government intervention to forestall foreign expropriation, or
legislation that conditions foreign or military aid upon nonconfisca-
tory domestic policies of the recipient."'
110. Larner, Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations,
1929 and 1963, 56 AM. Ec. Rev. 777, 781 (1966).
111. Id. at 785.
112. Id. at 786.
113. A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 380 (Great Books ed. 1952).
114. See W. SCHULTZ, supra note 90, at 176.
115. See id. at 169.
116. See id. at 181.
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Perhaps one could stress the validity of a capital levy per se, and
see the inheritance tax as a convenient administrative device to collect
it. Treatment of the inheritance tax as a delayed capital tax has been
criticized. Schultz contends that such a theory does not explain in-
clusion of an exemption schedule based on the closeness of the re-
lationship to the decedent. Although consistency is a desirable at-
tribute of a tax system, many of our taxes have built-in preferences
for various groups. While these should be scrutinized, nothing pre-
cludes tax policy from providing special considerations. Schultz also
argues that this is a double imposition of the same tax, since there is
already an income tax.'17 However, the income tax reaches accumu-
lated capital only indirectly, and among the wealthiest the income tax
is subject to such manipulation that not only capital, but also income,
often remain untaxed. The answer may be to amend the income tax,
but incentive is more likely to be reduced as a result of increases in
the taxation of income than by changes in the inheritance tax.
On the other hand, some economists have defended the inheritance
tax as a deferred capital tax. The argument here is that the fairer tax
is one on savings. If that is the case, the income tax is less desirable
than the inheritance tax because the income tax takes from the poor
a greater portion of potential savings than from the rich. The in-
heritance tax is regarded as preferable to a direct tax on savings because
it may accomplish the result without unduly discouraging thrift.
Schultz reports, however that economists seldom have agreed that
focusing on taxation of savings is desirable. 118
Another view in favor of the inheritance tax is that it can remedy
the failure of other taxes to produce "tax equality." Other taxes, goes
the argument, are often regressive but inheritance taxation can equalize
the tax burden.'"
Much inheritance tax analysis has focused on the decedent and
not on the beneficiary. If the focus is shifted, one must ask whether
beneficiaries already in privileged economic conditions should pay
more tax than those who are not. The Soviet system applies a means
test to inheritance-those needing inheritance are favored over those
who do not. How could such "deep pocket ability" be measured in
our system? Some theorists advocate treating inheritance proceeds as
a form of income to be added to the income tax return.2 0 Such ap-
proaches rest on the theory that progressive rates should be imposed on
117. For Mr. Schultz' analysis, see id. at 185-86.
118. Id. at 185-86.
119. Id. at 186.
120. Id. at 188.
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high-income beneficiaries because they have greater protection from
the tax bite than others with less income.' 2 '
Still another approach is that of socialist theorists. The thrust here
is not an argument couched in terms of economic efficiency, but a re-
jection of such analysis as irrelevant. The reasoning is that history is
explained by class conflict and that tax legislation is class oriented.
Schultz spells out the history of the inheritance tax as a means for
the class in power to adopt taxation systems that favor itself at the
expense of other classes. In England, the landowning class at first
discriminated against the industrial and commercial classes. Later the
industrial and commercial classes gained power and discriminated
against the landowners."2 This parallels the history previously dis-
cussed, wherein the permissiveness of the Rule was first the instrument
of the landowning class, but later was co-opted by the industrial and
commercial classes and applied to personalty as a means of maintaining
their position.1 23
There may be other means of attacking the problem of concen-
trated wealth. The income tax has already been mentioned. But few
taxes, income or otherwise, deplete existing personalty and realty as
effectively as a capital tax. Some states levy an intangible property, or
solvent credits tax. This tax is often defeated by concealment and
tends to be unenforced, but there could be a properly administered
annual wealth tax. It is argued that such a tax would strike at the
conservers of wealth, rather than earners of income, and if substituted
for the income tax at higher levels might promote growth and
efficiency. A wealth tax would also eliminate the problem that some
wealth is accumulated and spent and is therefore unavailable for
taxation at death. The result could compel the productive use of
capital and avoid the forms of accumulation in which capital is often
conservatively invested. Perhaps the annual wealth tax should be
coupled with the estate tax, as is the case in Germany and Sweden. 24
E. Government as the Redistributor
Another concern is that even if concentrations of wealth can be
reduced by greater taxation, the government itself will defeat this
effort by returning this revenue to the same powerful and wealthy
121. Id.
122. Id. at 190-95. Schultz finds that to describe nineteenth century inheritance tax
struggles solely as class conflict would be an exaggeration; to neglect that feature
would make an analysis decidedly incomplete. Id. at 192.
123. See pp. 37-40 supra.
124. See Bale, supra note 12, at 123.
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segment of the population or by wastefully, or corruptly, using the
tax revenue.
Schultz points out that if more wealth were to escheat to the
state, revenue would be greatly increased. A significant number of
payments would have to be made in kind, and land and business
property would then be socially owned.' 25 This was perhaps the ac-
celerated effect of the revolutions in the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. It
is possible that there would be a shift from the present economy of
concentrated private wealth to an economy of concentrated public
wealth managed by persons composing a state or public bu-
reaucracy.
This possibility raises concerns as to whether it is desirable to use
the government, over which the rich and powerful have substantial
control, as the vehicle for wealth redistribution. The answer to such
concerns lies in the belief or hope that citizens will utilize the demo-
cratic process to make the state responsible. Measures to achieve such
responsibility are outside the scope of this article, but would involve
such things as strong, and seriously enforced, financial disclosure laws;
conflict of interest restrictions; public financing of political campaigns;
and improved access to government functions. Redistribution subject
to such checks and pressures would indeed reduce the vulnerability
of government and governmental officials to control by those who hold
most of this country's wealth. It is at least possible that wealth and
power could be redistributed to those presently "disenfranchised,"
and that democratic controls could be maintained and exercised.
At present, only minimal controls are exercised over the private
oligarchy that runs this country's enterprises. The situation could be
no worse if wealth were held by government, which is subject to at
least some checks. Unless the political process alters the distribution
of wealth, wealth and power will become more concentrated. Aggregat-
ing wealth in the state is not a cure-all, but it is an initial step that
must be taken.
VII. CONCLUSION
The large concentrations of privately held wealth in the United
States continue to be a threat to the principles of a democratic country.
A great potential for remedying this imbalance exists within the legal
community. This article has suggested reforms related to the Rule
against Perpetuities and the estate tax structure that could do much
to reduce such concentrations of wealth and power.
125. W. SCHULTZ, supra note 90, at 198.
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Concentrated wealth has historically avoided legal instruments
designed to reach it. Many capable and ingenious minds are directed
to this end; it will take equally ingenious minds to end the cycle.
We can rest assured that entrenched capital will not lightly accept
a shift to a more equal allocation of resources. Property may take on
new forms or utilize old forms to escape taxation and prevent imple-
mentation of democratic goals embodied in the notion that property
exists to serve human needs. Traditional doctrines and policy are
often unable to keep pace with changing forms. It is time to take
additional steps to close this gap.
Any revolution in curtailing inheritance will probably come about
slowly and will be characterized by power struggles at every turn.
Perhaps it will be carried on in much the same manner as other con-
troversial reforms today, such as restrictions on private use of land
and limitations on the arbitrary exercise of power by governmental
officials.
This reform task will be difficult and must be approached prag-
matically and experimentally. It should not surprise us that much
current legal doctrine reflects the existing power distribution, and
carries with it the ideological baggage of the powerful controlling
classes. 126 But we should strive to counteract this built-in preference
for the status quo. Reform of the Rule and the estate tax is vital if we
are to ameliorate the social effects of wealth concentration. Ironically,
the problem is best summarized by one who was himself the beneficiary
of substantial inherited wealth. Franklin D. Roosevelt said:
The desire to provide security for one's self and one's family
is natural and wholesome, but it is adequately served by a reason-
able inheritance. Great accumulations of wealth cannot be justified
on the basis of personal and family security. In the last analysis
such accumulations amount to the perpetuation of great and un-
desirable concentration of control in a relatively few individuals
over the employment and welfare of many, many others.
Such inherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals
of this generation as inherited political power was inconsistent with
the ideals of the generation which established our government. 127
126. Cf., Van Doren, Ownership of Yugoslav Social Property and United States
Industrial Property-A Comparison, 26 RUTCERs L. REv. 73 (1972).
127. F.D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, supra note 104.
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PATRICIA DoRE
The new Florida Administrative Procedure Act, Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 74-310, became
fully effective January 1, 1975. The Attorney General sponsored a conference on the new
Act in Tallahassee, Florida, on December 10, 1974. The objectives of the conference
were to assist government agencies with implementation of the Act and to introduce the
new Act to members of the Florida Bar and the general public. Speakers were invited
to discuss specific aspects of the Act. Those chosen included drafters of the Act, officials
from both legislative and executive branches of state government, and administrative
law professors.
